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with partbular relerence to the United States
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the
United States the primary superpower in the world;
(ii) Considering that the Democratic President of the United States, President Clinton, has proclaimed
his frst priority in his political objectives to be the settling of America's urgent internal problems in the
field of irecessary reforms in the social health, educational and budgetary system as well as in the fight
against criminality and tenorism;(iii) Recalling also that the new United States priorities in foreign and securify pollcy are concenffated
on the creation of a new kind of Asian-Pacific community, containing nuclear proliferation in countries
such as North Korea, China and Russia and reducing the American anti-missile defence programme fol-
lowing a sffict interpretation of the ABM Treaty;
(iv) Observing however that the freedom of action of the United States President has been considerably
curtailed by the sweeping victory of the Republican Parry in the congressional elections on 8th Novem-
ber 1994 which appeared to weaken the policy of a bipartisan approach;
(v) Noting that the new Congress, which is still working out its policy direction, has started trying to
impose restrictions on the American executive regarding, in particular, its foreign, secgrity and def9n9-e
poficy, by drafting new legislation such as the'o Peace Power Act " and the " National Security Revitali-
sation Act ";
(vi) Noting with satisfaction that United States foreign policy has been successful in finalising the North
American Fiee Trade Agreement (NAFIA) with the support of the Canadian Parliament, revitalising
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and co-operating in the ASEAN Regional Security Forum,
thus conffibuting to enhancing economic and security stability in the regions concerned;
(vii) Noting uneasily, however, that the various signals emanating from the United States Government
and Congress and the steps they are taking regarding relations with Europe, the future of the Atlantic
Alliance and its enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries, relations with Russia and the r6le
of the United Nations are not always consistent, nor does the United States consult on these questions suf-
ficiently with its European allies and partners;
(viii) Worned about the serious differences between the United States and most of its European allies
over the ways of settling the conflict in former Yugoslavia;(ix) Further angered that the decisions reached at the NAIO summit meeting in January 1994 to make
collective assets of the alliance available for WEU operations are still not being carried into effect,
because of remaining Euro-American differences over the procedure to follow;(x) Having a strong impression that the question of whether and how Euro-American relations should
be renewed and founded on a new and enlarged contractual basis are being discussed far more by Euro-
pean than byAmerican politicians;(xi) Deploring the incredible dfficulties in establishing a regular parliamentary dialogue between the
Assembly of Westem European Union and the Congress of the United States;
(xii) Reiterating the importance of making full use of Article [V of the modified Brussels Treaty for estab-
lishing closer links with the United States Government through WEU's co-operation with NATO,
Rrcouurxps rHAr rrn Coutqcr
1. Translate into active policy its intention voiced in its Noordwijk declaration " to continue to work
together in close association with the North American allies. The security o1fl1s alliance and of F.urope as
a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests.
Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, indepen-
dent and increasingly more united Europe will contribute to the security of North America ";
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?. Devote a special chapter to the future r6le of the United States in regard to European security and
the question of reforming transatlantic relations in the white paper now being prepared on European secu-
,itv;
3. Transform the wo_rking group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities into a tnre political forum with
which ministers of WEU member countries can establish an enhanced dialogue with United States politi-
cians in order to strengthen their interest in and knowledge of WEU's work in the European and trinsat-
lantic framework and ensure that members of the Assembly can participate in this dial6gue or in a new
North American/European Parliamentary Assembly based on the WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies.
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E xplnnat o ry M e m or and.um
(submified by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. In the period between the Political Commit-
tee's visit to the United States and Canada in
February l992whtch led to Recommendanon522
on new Euro-American relations' and the commit-
tee's visit to the two countries between lst and
8th March 1995, the intemal political landscape of
the United States has changed fundamentally: since
20th January 1993, the only remaining world
superpower has been governed by one ofthe youn-
gest Presidents so far, the Democrat Bill Clinton,
whose fust priority 
- 
as he had promised during the
electoral campaign 
- 
w6, from the very start of his
presidency, to concentrate on settling America's
urgent internal problems such as budget consolida-
tion, reform of the social health and educational
system and also the fight against criminality.
2. The frst outline of Clinton's foreign policy
seemed to be focused on efforts to create a sort of
new Pacific Community on the basis of a CSCE-
like organisation in the Asian area called the
" Asia Regional Security Forum " in which China
and Russia should also participate. Regarding
Europe and in particular the conflict in the Bal-
kans, the lack of a clear concept in the American
administration led to early difficulties and diffe-
rences in the Euro-Atlantic partnership which also
affected the North Atlantic Alliance.
3. The result of the congressional elections on
8th November l994,providing a clear Republican
majority in both chambers of the Congress (230 to
204 n the House and 53 to 47 n the Senate), led
to a situation in which the new majority in
Congress, which started work on 4th January 1995,
tried to impose on the Clinton administration a
new policy direction which had not however been
clearly defined. The first draft bill drawn up by
Congress, the so-called " National Securiry Revi-
talisation Act ", passed in February 1995 by the
House but not yet by the Senate, embodies the
defence priorities outlined in the Republican
" Contract with America ", thus restricting United
States participation in United Nations peace-kee-
ping operations and, conversely, advocating
strengthening anti-missile defence and including
specific Central European countries, such as
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia in NATO.
4. Regarding United States' policy towards
NAIO, the bill affirms among other things:
" (4) Although new threats are more geo-
graphically and functionally diverse and
less predictable, they still imperil shared
interests of the United States and its NATO
allies.
(5) Western interests must be protected on a
co-operative basis without an undue burden
falling upon the United States.
(6) NATO is the only multilateral organisa-
tion that is capable of conducting effective
military operations to protect western
interests.
(7) The valuable experience gained from
on-going military co-operation within
NATO was critical to the success of joint
military operations in the 1991 liberation of
Kuwait.
(8) NATO is an important diplomatic forum
for discussion of issues of concern to its
member states and for the peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes.
It should be the policy of the United States:
(1) to continue the nation's commitment to
an active leadership r6le in NATO;
(2) to join with the nation's NATO allies to
redefine the r6le of the alliance in the post-
cold war world, taking into account:
(a) the fundamentally changed security
environment of Central and Eastern
Europe;
(b) the need to assure all countries of the
defensive nature of the alliance and the
desire of its members to work co-opera-
tively with all former adversaries;
(c) the emerging security threats posed by
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons of mass des-
truction and the means to deliver them;
(d) the continuing challenges to the inter-
ests of all NATO member countries
posed by unstable and undemocratic
r6gimes harbouring hostile intentions;
and
4
1. Document 1310,2nd Jtuu,;re1992.
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(e) the dependence of the global economy
on a stable energy supply and the free
flow of commerce:
(3) to atrim that NAIO military planning
should include joint military operations
beyond the geographic bounds of the
alliance under Article 4 of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty when the shared interests of the
United States and other member countries
require such action to defend vital interests;
(4) to expeditiously pursue joint co-opera-
tion agreements for the acquisition of essen-
tial.systems to significantly increase the
crisis-management capability of NAIO. "
5. Apart from specific items such as anti-mis-
sile defence, command of United States forces and
limiting the outlay of United States funds forAme-
rican forces placed under United Nations control,
conditions required by Congress regarding United
States contributions for United Nations peace-
keeping activities and expansion of NATO, ihe bill
does not discuss the problems of future Euro-
Atlantic relations. In a joint article published in
February 1995 in The New York Times'z, both the
United States Foreign Secretary, Warren Christo-
pher, and Defence Secretary, William J. Perry, said
the draft bill was " deeply flawed ":
" The bill's first flaw is that it would return
the United States to a crash-schedule
deployment of a national missile defence
designed to protect the country from missile
attacks. That deployment is not justified by
any existing threat to our nation's security.
Second, the bill unilaterally and perma-
nently designates certain European states
for NATO membership...
Thfud, the bill would effectively abrogate
our treaty obligations to pay our share of
the cost of the United Nations peace-keep-
ing operations that we have supported in
the Security Council... Under current cir-
cumstances, it would end United Nations
peace-keeping overnight. "
6. The abovementioned example of differ-
ences between Congress and govemment in the
United States demonstrates the start of a power
stnrggle between these two main political bodies
and hence the question of who in the United
States directs foreign policy. The answer to this
question is crucial for a future European approach
to redefining United States/European relations.
7. This problem has been further aggravated
by the drafting in the United States Senate of a
new bill devoted to clarifying the war powers of
Congress and the President in the post-cold war
period under the title " Peace Powers Act of
1995 ". According to this draft, the President
" shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States armed forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated ". Furthermore, the draft
bill envisages sfrong limitations on the freedom of
action of the President regarding the placing of
United States armed forces under foreign com-
mand for United Nations peace-keeping activities.
8. But also within the administration itself it is
not easy to identify valid concepts regarding United
States priorities in foreign and security policy which
take into account the radical changes in the intema-
tional political landscape since the end of the East-
West confrontation. It was therefore the main pur-
pose of the Political Committee's visit to the United
States and Canada to leam more about future United
States foreign policy and its implications for trans-
atlantic co-operation in security and defence mat-
ters and, in particular, for the future development of
WEU as defence component of the European Union
and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
II. Euolution of lniled States foreign, security
and defence policy since the NATO summit
meeting in Janaary 1994
9. When the committee started its visit to the
United States, its knowledge depended on formal
decisions reached or official speeches published
by leading American politicians since the demo-
cratic administration assumed responsibilify for
United States foreign and security policy. One of
the major decisions endorsed by the United States
President was the readiness proclaimed at the
NATO summit meeting, on 10th and llth Janu-
ary 1994 in Brussels'o to make collective assets of
the alliance available, on the basis of consulta-
tions in the North Atlantic Council, forWEU ope-
rations undertaken by the European allies in pur-
suit of their common foreign and security policy ".
10. According to information provided by the
United Kingdom Government to the House of
Lords in January 1995, NATO collective assets
include communications, command and control,
as well as airborne early-waming and other facili-
ties, but not intelligence unilaterally obtained by
the United States from space. On the question of
whether non-European members of NATO would
be in a position to veto the use of the " collective
assets ", the United Kingdom government recal-
led that " all decisions taken by the North Atlantic
Council are by consensus3 ".
11. During the committee's visit to Washington
Mr. Peter Tarnoff, Under-Secretary for Political
3. Hansard, House of Lords, Volume 560, No. 19 WAJ, 9th
January 1995.2. Intemational Herald Tribune, l4th February 1995.
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Affairs at the State Department, categorically
denied the question about the United States block-
ing the outcome of the current discussion between
WEU and NATO on the ways and means of
making NATO's assets available to WEU, under-
lining that there was now more encouragement in
the United States for a European defence identity.
However, he added that the idea of totally inde-
pendent action by WEU was undesirable because
this would undermine the close co-operation bet-
ween NATO and WEU. At the Pentagon,
Mr. Walter Slocombe, Under-Secretary of Defen-
ce for Policy, said, in the context of the question
of combined joint task forces (CJTF), that accor-
ding to the American concept, providing WEU
with NATO assets should be conducted under
NATO command, even if the relevant NATO staff
in such cases had to follow instructions from the
WEU Council.
12. On the basis of the work of the new pottico-
military working group created by the WEU
Council in June 1994, WEU presented to NAIO a
proposal on " Criteria and modalities for effective
use by WEU of the combined joint task forces
(CJTF). It is still waiting for an answer. In the
second part of its fortieth annual report to the
Assembly, the Council states that the strength-
ening of WEU's operational r6le depends on
NAIO's elaboration of the CJTF concept and that
the results will be a test case both forWEUA'{ATO
relations and for the operational potential of WEU.
Unfortunately, the Council did not use this ques-
tion to examine how it fits into the framework of
the broader problem of future Euro-American co-
operation in security and defence matters.
13. Even after the numerous talks the commit-
tee was able to hold with the relevant governmen-
tal, parliamentary and research institutions during
its visit to Washington, it remains difficult to fit
NATO's decision of January 1994 nto a broader
concept of a new United States foreign and secu-
rity policy. Was this decision an indication that the
United States would more and more renounce its
leadership r6le in transatlantic relations by giving
Europe more responsibilities in matters where the
Americans would not take a prominent r6le?
14. The answer is difficult to find. However
even if President Clinton, in his State of the Union
address to the new Congress on 25th January
1995, did not mention Europe in a single sen-
tence, he emphasised that
" our securiry depends upon our continued
world leadership for peace, freedom and
democracy. We cannot be strong at home
without being strong abroad.
From my frst day in office I have pledged
that our nation would maintain the best
equipped, best trained and best prepared
fighting force on earth. We have 
- 
and they
are. They have managed the dramatic
down-sizing of our forces since the cold
war with remarkable skill and spirit. To
make sure our military is ready for action 
-
and to provide the pay and quality of life
that the military and their families deserve
- 
I am asking this Congress to add
25 000 million more in defence spending
over the next six years. Tonight I repeat that
request. We ask much of our armed forces.
They are called to service in many ways 
-
and we must give them and their families
what the time demands and they deserve. "
15. But where are the priorities of United
States foreign policy needing such highly quali-
fied armed forces as requested by the United
States President? According to his Foreign Secre-
tary, Warren Christopher, developing key prin-
ciples for a United States foreign policy in a
speech on26th January 1995 at the John F. Ken-
nedy School of Govemmenta:
oo first, America must continue to engage
and lead. Second, we must seek to maintain
and strengthen co-operative relationships
with the world's most powerful nations.
Third, it is essential that we adapt and build
institutions that will promote economic and
security co-operation. Fourth, we support
democracy and human rights because it
serves our ideals and our interests. "
16. Explaining in a more detailed way the
question of leadership, the United States Foreign
Secretary underlined that:
" American leadership requires that we be
ready to back diplomacy with the credible
threat of force. Towards this end, Presi-
dent Clinton is determined that the United
States military will remain the most powerful
and effective fighting force in the world.
When our vital interests are at stake, we
must be prepared to act alone. Our willing-
ness to do so is often the key to effectivejoint action. But the recent debate between
the proponents of unilateral and multilateral
action assumes a false choice. Multilatera-
lism is a means, not an end. Sometimes, by
mobilising the support of other nations, by
leveraging our power and leading through
alliances and institutions, we will achieve
beffer results at lower cost in human hfe and
national treasure. That is a sensible bargain I
know the American people support. "
L7. The remarks are interesting in two respects.
Firstly in the context that the draft budget for the
Pentagon for 1996 is reduced by 6.6Vo in compa-
rison with the fiscal year 1995 and the number of
4. USIS, Foreign Policy, Brussels, 23rd January 1995.
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military forces should consequently be reduced to
1.6 million troops (1987: 2.2 million). Secondly,
the Foreign Secretary gives a reply on the ques-
tion discussed in several circles about whether the
United States is moving towards some sort of neo-
isolationism.
18. In an article by William Saflres to which
AmbassadorKornblum made reference during his
briefing of the Political Committee in Washing-
ton, it was stated that:
" the essential conflict taking place in Uni-
ted States foreign policy today is not bet-
ween isolationists and interventionists
(who prefer to be called intemationalists).
Global heavy thinkers are not arguing
about withdrawing from America's duty to
help keep the world in order. The real battle
is about the way to go about it.
One school says America should pick its
spots and assert its leadership, inspiring
and pressuring and expecting allies to fol-
low. These unilateralists, as the foreign
policy 6lite likes to call them, are opposed
by multilateralists, who believe the United
States should act mainly in concert with
international organisations like the United
Nations and NATO.
Mr. Clinton is an unabashed multilateralist.
'The new isolationists both on the left and
the right', he charged, would 'eliminate any
meaningful rOle for the United Nations'
and 'deny resources to ourpeace-keepers'.
The opposite unilateralist policy was
expressed by Mr. Nixon long ago to the
cadets: '[ say that America has a vital natio-
nal interest in world stability, and no other
nation can uphold that interest for us. "
19. Regarding the second principle, Mr. War-
ren Christopher underlined that:
" our strategy is the central importance of
constructive relations with the world's most
powerful nations: our Western European
allies, Japan, China and Russia. These
nations possess the political, economic or
military capability to affect the well-being
of every American. The relatively co-ope-
rative relations that these countries now
have with each other are unprecedented in
this century, but not irreversible.
Our strategy toward the great powers begins
with Westem Europe and Japan. We must
revitalise our alliances with this democratic
core. We must also seize the opportunities
that now exist to build constructive relations
with China and Russia, countries that once
were our fiercest adversaries. Both are
undergoing momentous, though very diffe-
rent, ffansformations that will directly affect
American interests. "
20. It becomes very clear from this approach
that relations with Europe are described in a glo-
bal context together with relations with Japan,
China and Russia, then demonstrating that, for
America, as Mr. Komblum said, 'o Europe is not
the world ". Whereas problems of relations with
Europe are not further developed, Mr. Christopher
elaborates in more depth the importance of rela-
tionships with Japan, China and Russia.
21. The United States' relationship with Russia
also played an important r61e in the Political
Committee's discussions in both Washington and
Ottawa. Whereas Canadian foreign ministry
representatives recognised that Russia remains a
major concern for the security preoccupations of
other countries, while Canada's relations with it
are in general without major problems, Washing-
ton spokesmen gave various interpretations regar-
ding the present state of United States-Russian
relations and United States policy followed in this
respect.
22. In Mr. Christopher's words, the United
States' relationship with Russia is central to Ame-
rica's security.
" The United States has an enormous stake
in the outcome of Russia's continuing
transformation ... that is why the Clinton
administration has been unwavering in our
support for Russian reform. "
However, members of the Camegie Endowment
for lnternational Peace in Washington expressed
major doubts as to whether there existed a cohe-
rent United States policy towards Russia, since
there was always a contradiction between a strong
pro-Yeltsin approach and efforts to enlarge
NATO. The United States had also overestimated
its ability to influence the political situation in
Russia. All questions regarding NAIO enlarge-
ment were considered in Russia in a very emotio-
nal, not rational way. Summing up, there is now a
major crisis in United States/Russian relations
and it would be easy for Congress to blackmail
the administration in this area.
23. The assessment by representatives of the
State Department focused on uncertainties in Rus-
sia's future internal evolution. Whereas Yeltsin is
making major efforts to strengthen state power, a
new kind of power struggle between pressure
groups such as the banking, oil and gas lobbies
can be seen. Moscow's central power seems to be
growing weaker and local authorities are streng-
thening ties with local military authorities. United
States policy tries to convince Russia that enlarge-
ment by NATO is not meant to isolate it but to
contribute to stabilising the situation. Moscow's5. Intemational Herald Tribune, 7th March 1995.
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dfficulties in Central Asia would strengthen its
desire to improve relations with the West.
24. Regarding Russia's handling of the Chech-
nya conflict, the official United States position
expressed by its Foreign Secretary is that:
" the way in which Russia has used military
force has been excessive and threatens to
have a corrosive effect on the future of Rus-
sian democracy. As I told Foreign Minis-
ter Kosyrev, the war must end and'a process
of reconciliation must begrn. What we do
not want to see is a Russia in a
military quagmire that erodes reform and
tends to isolate it in the intemational com-
munity. "
25. In the State Department, it was affirmed
that the United States had made known to the
Russians that their action in Chechnya was not
consistent with recognised international norms.
But vigorous criticism was expressed, particularly
in the Heritage Foundation regarding the reluctan-
ce of the United States Government to protest
more vigorously against Russian warfare in
Chechnya and that there was no United States
support for European politicians when they tried
to call for a more rigorous attitude vis-i-vis Rus-
sia. There was also strong criticism from leading
republicans when President Clinton recently deci-
ded to accept President Yeltsin's invitation to par-
ticipate in the celebration in Moscow of the ffieth
anniversary of the end of the second world war.
26. ln the framework of the preparation of the
summit meeting between President Clinton and
President Yeltsin in Moscow, there were signs of
new irritation between the United States and some
of the European allies in NATO over the way the
United States President intended to present to the
Russian Government the question of NATO's
enlargement. According to rumours appearing in
the German press particularly, the American Pre-
sident, in a letter addressed to President Yeltsin,
had even not excluded a full membership of
NATO for Russia, but this was categorically
denied by the American authorities. In any case,
all questions relating to NATO enlargement are
controversial between the allies and Russia and
there are also important dffierences between the
United States and its European allies on this ques-
tion which is of great significance for the enlarge-
ment of Westem European Union. Furthermore,
leading Republicans have severely criticised the
results of the American-Russian summit meeting
in Moscow, in particular with respect to the war in
Chechnya and Mr. Clinton's unsuccessful efforts
to dissuade Russia from concluding a nuclear deal
with kan, thus threatening to stop any congressio-
nal support for further financial aid to Russia.
27. Regarding the American concept of its
future relations with Europe, it could be conside-
red as some confirmation of the relevant approach
in the abovementioned speech by Mr Warren
Christopher, when a member of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace stated that
Europe was not a major issue in the United States;
otherwise (according to this expert) there would
be calls in the United States for it to withdraw its
remaining troops from Europe. American interest
in European affairs was far more concemed with
economlc lssues.
28. The fact that there are several subjects over
which fundamental differences exist between
Americans and Europeans, or where important
problems of elaborating a joint transatlantic stra-
tegy are to be solved, seems to bother Americans
to a lesser extent than Europeans. The first
example is the problem of the conflict in former
Yugoslavia. The official version published by
Mr. Warren Christopher on 20th January 1995
underlines:
" The tragic war in Bosnia underscores the
importance of building an effective new
architecture for conflict-prevention and
resolution. Together with our partners in the
contact group, we are seeking a negotiated
solution because only a negotiated solution
has any chance of lasting and preventing a
wider war. What we must not do is to make
the situation worse by unilaterally lifting the
arms embargo. We have always believed
that the embargo is unfair. But going it alone
would lead to the withdrawal of UNPRO-
FOR and an escalation of violence. It would
americanise the conflict and lead others to
abandon the sanctions on Serbia. It would
undermine the authority of all United
Nations Security Council resolutions inclu-
ding sanctions on Iraq and Libya. "
29. Nevertheless, the United States decided not
to participate any more in the enforcement of the
arms embargo in the Adriatic. This American
decision was an unusual step and, for the flust time
since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance the
WEU Council, in its Noordwijk declaration, criti-
cised in public a decision of its most powerful and
important ally. Whereas the North Atlantic Coun-
cil's final communiqu6 published on 3rd Decem-
ber 1,994 avoided open criticism of the United
States, Frederick Bonnart, editor of NAIO's Six-
teen Nations, made a very sharp comment in the
press on l4th November 19946, when he said that
the American order shows complete disregard for
the aims and constraints of friends and allies, as
well as those of Russia 'o the impression of a Uni-
ted States Congress determined to bulldoze
through its decisions regardless of America's
allies was reinforced by the way the information
reached NATO. A leaked newspaper story arrived
before any official notification... The danger is
6. Intemational Herald Tribune, l4th November 1994.
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geat... A leaked report from one of the NATO
ambassadors stated that 'cracks are appearing in
the alliance' ".
30. It is obvious that the United States position
regarding the conflict in former Yugoslavia was
one of the major subjects of discussion during the
committee's recent visit to Washington. There were
no signs from the American side that the United
States was considering deploying peace-keeping
troops in the area, like other United Nations mem-
ber countries and, in particular, France and Britain.
In the State Department, Mr. Kornblum said that
even if, according to the Helsinki Charter, borders
were not to be changed other than by peaceful
agreement, there was no internationally agfeed bor-
der guarantee, obliging United States troops to
intervene in every given case. Affirming that the
United States was present with about 16 000 people
in the area, he stated that the United Nations
approach employed so far in Bosnia and Croatia
had led to a situation in which UNPROFOR had
not conffibuted to a solution but had become part of
the problem. But he admitted that, if the embargo
on Bosnia was lifted, there would be an increased
danger of a new violent war in the area.
Mr. Alexander Vershbaw, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European Affairs
in the United States National Security Council, said
that the United States ground forces would not be
engaged in the area except to protect a possible
withdrawal of the United Nations forces.
3 I . ln the event of a United Nations withdrawal,
the United States was still inclined to support Bos-
nia with arms, because Bosnians were the victims.
But the United States would not act unilaterally.
Mr. Vershbaw categorically denied press reports
according to which Americans were already sup-
plying Bosnia with arms. It was very important to
strengthen the Federation between Bosnia and
Croatia, which still had problems to deal with. On
the question of imposing possible economic sanc-
tions on Croatia in order to force Mr. Thdjman to
renounce his request for a withdrawal of United
Nations troops from Croatia, Mr. Vershbaw said
that during Mr. Holbrook's last visit to Croatia, the
United States side had adopted a very firm attitude
forwards Croatia. But one had to be careful in
order to avoid Croatia eventually entering into an
unholy alliance with Mr. Milosevic.
32. During the talks in the House of Represen-
tatives, one of the Congressmen acknowledged
that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake to lift
the embargo unilaterally and any measures should
be decided in close consultation with the Euro-
pean allies. There was general frustration regar-
ding the impossibility of ending hostilities in the
Balkans, but Congress had insufficient knowledge
of the historical grounds of the conflict.
33. During the committee's visit to Washington
it was regrettably not possible to meet the relevant
committees of the United States Senate, which
had cancelled the planned meeting at short notice.
Nevertheless, your Rapporteur did have the
opportunity of meeting Admiral Nance, Chief-of-
Staff to Senator Helms, the Foreign Relations
Chairman. He confirmed that NATO would be
supported more strongly by the new Congress and
said that if the United States lifted the Bosnian
arms embargo, he was sure that United States
military would be available to cover any withdra-
wal of United Nations troops. He thought that
NATO enlargement might proceed in stages, the
first being attendance and participation in all mee-
tings. When these countries had got their forces to
a stage compatible with NATO and had also the
financial resources to sustain full membership,
then full membership would follow, with all that it
entailed. Of course the final policy decisions are
taken by the Senate and Congress but it was most
reassuring to know the tenor of advice being offe-
red to members.
34. The second example is the question of the
enlargement of NAIO. The American approach
seems to have in mind, first and foremost, the
interests of Russia, second the future character of
NATO but not to any great extent the interests of
the European Union and Western European
Union. As already mentioned in Mrs. Aguiar's
report, the Americans made very clear what had
already been said by Mr. Slocombe during the last
North Atlantic Assembly session:
" The question about WEU and NAIO, let
me only say that I think the United States
Government would view with considerable
concem a situation in which counffies were
full members of WEU and were not also
members of the alliance, if only for the for-
mal reason that the WEU security guarantee
is, if anything, firmel and more automatic
than the NATO guarantee, and it would
create for the United States and for any
other non-member of WEU that is in the
alliance the awkward situation in which
some members of the alliance were absolu-
tely obligated to the security of countries
which were not in the alliance ... while I
take the point entirely about the fact that we
must not forget in our consideration of
expansion the issue of the states which were
neutral during the cold war and are now in
the process of joining the European Union,
there are problems about seeing WEU as
some kind of a way station in this sense. "
35. Reverting to the third principle of United
States strategy described by Mr. Warren Christo-
pher, he observed that the United States " must
adapt and revitalise the institution of global and
regional co-operation... Our challenge now is to
revitalise those institutions 
- 
NATO, the United
Nations, the lnternational Monetary Fund and the
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World Bank, the OECD, among others ". Several
very different problems are thus summarised in
one phrase.
36. Regarding NAIO and relations with Europe,
it was said simply that " NAIO remains the author
of American engagement in Europe and the linch-
pin of transatlantic security. NATO has always
been far more than a transitory guarantor of Euro-
pean democracy and a force for European stabili-
ty ". There is no indication whether and in what
way the American Government deems it necessa-
ry to reform the Atlantic Alliance or to adapt the
whole range of transatlantic relationships on a
new and broader basis.
37 . The question of continuity of United States
foreign policy was addressed by Mr. Christopher
as follows:
" The recent elections changed the balance
of power between the parties. But they did
not change, indeed they enhanced, our res-
ponsibility to co-operate on a bipartisan
basis in foreign affairs. The election was
not a licence to lose sight of our nation's
global interests or to walk away from our
commitments in the world. Leaders of both
parties understand that well.
Bipartisan co-operation has always been
grounded in the conviction that our nation's
enduring interests do not vary with the
times. President Harry Truman had it right
40 years ago: ' Circumstances change ', he
said, ' but the great issues remain the same
- 
prosperity, welfareo human rights, effective
democracy, and above all peace. '
With the cold war behind us, the United
States has a chance to build a more secure
and integrated world of open societies and
open markets. We are the world's largest
military and economic power. Our nation's
founding principles still inspire people all
over the world. We are blessed with great
resources and resolve. We still continue to
use them with wisdom, with strength, and
with the backing of the American people ".
38. The Political Committee obviously used its
stay in Washington and Ottawa to discuss also the
position of the two countries regarding worldwide
crisis-management, peace-keeping, reform of the
Charter and the Security Council of the United
Nations, the r6le of regional organisations and in
particular that of the OSCE, and questions of
worldwide arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation. As these matters are dealt with prin-
cipally in the framework of the report to be pre-
sented by Mr. Marshall, your Rapporteur will
concentrate here mainly on the consequences of
United States policy on transatlantic relations.
III. American and European perceptions
of tran s atlantic r e latio n s
39. In this context it is interesting to note an
article on the findings of a recent survey of Ame-
rican public opinion in the area of foreign affairs,
published recently in the German pressT under the
headline " America not contaminated by neo-iso-
lationist virus ".
oo Tlvo thirds of Americans and9SVo of the
'ruling' elite expressly state they are in
favour of the United States being actively
involved in foreign policy. They think
America has a more important part to play
today than ten years ago. This stance in
favour of a world r6le for the United States
became clear from the most recent survey
of the Chicago Council on Foreign Rela-
tions which every four years ' takes the
temperature' of American public opinion
on foreign affairs and compares it with the
position of leading figures in the world of
politics, the economy and science.
The spectacular changes which have occur-
red over the last five years have, it is true,
led to a sharp focus of attention on national
interests. The study highlights the 'prag-
matic internationalism' of the American
people.
Even the defence of America's traditional
allies is no longer regarded as important in
the eyes of the American public, whose
interests are now concentrated exclusively
on their own well-being: the fight against
drug addiction, protecting American jobs,
controlling illegal immigration, guaran-
teeing energy supplies and reducing Ameri-
ca's external deficit. The only universal
subjects of interest constituting major
foreign policy objectives are prevention of
nuclear armaments proliferation and envi-
ronmental protection.
Despite being inward-looking, public opi-
nion surprisingly comes out in favour of
strengthening the United Nations and
contributing to multilateral peace-keeping
operations. Opinion is divided on whether
United States troops can be subordinated to
United Nations command, while leaders
accept this idea.
Public opinion and leaders have very diffe-
rent opinions on whether United States
foreign policy should in future give priority
to Europe or Asia. Public opinion is in
10
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favour of Europe by an overwhelming
majority, while economists tend to favour
both equally, the government has a clear
preference for Asia and Congress is split
down the middle between Asia and Europe.
Public opinion and the 6lite are, however,
in agreement on one point: unification of
Europe is a good thing for the United
States ... "
40. Regarding the future of ffansatlantic ties, it
seems that in general Europeans are more concer-
ned than Americans about the need to give serious
thought to ways and means of reorganising Euro-
American relations and co-operation to take into
account the changing international political land-
scape. In an article published in the International
Herald Tribune on 30th March 1995, Mr. Kinkel,
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, advocated
an enlarged transatlantic partnership including not
only the security, but also the economic, cultural,
scientific and human relation dimensions. A simi-
lar approach was suggested by the German Defen-
ce Minister, Volker Rtihe, whereas the out-going
French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, prefer-
red to limit the reform of ffansatlantic ties to secu-
rity issues alone. Both the German Foreign and
Defence Ministers had already stressed at the
Munich Conference in February 1995 that NATO
was no longer sufficient as the only basis for
transatlantic relations.
41. Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands raised similar questions
in an article published in the March 1995 edition
of the NATO Review in which he asked whether a
new contract should be limited to transatlantic
security relations only. His point of view is very
close to the German position. Last but not least,
Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for
Defence of the United Kingdom, also in the
March 1995 edition of the NATO Review, stres-
sed the need to build a new Atlantic Community
on four pillars: " The first pillar is our shared
belief in the rule of law and parliamentary demo-
cracy. The second is liberal capitalism and free
trade which has given all our people unpreceden-
ted prosperity. The third is the shared European
cultural heritage emanating from classical Greece
and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared
values, beliefs and civilisations of our own cen-
tury. The fourth pillar must be defence and securi-
ty as represented by the NAIO alliance. "
42. But the Euro-American discussions on
these issues are not a one-way European street.
Important American voices are also heard. The
former United States Minister Henry A. Kissinger
has proposed that the Atlantic Community be set
in the context of a new global world orderE. Fur-
thermore, the American Secretary of State for
Defence, Mr. William J. Perry, made an important
contribution at the Munich Conference on Secur-
ity Policy on 5th February 1995, in which he
underlined that times have changed, that the basis
for NATO has changed andoo as we adapt Europe(NATO) for the next century, we must deal with
the tough questions and issues raised by our new
relationship ". But this intervention was founded
on a strong belief in the validity of the key
grounds of the Atlantic Alliance as the main
bedrock of Euro-American co-operation.
43. A much more pessimistic view was expres-
sed by Stephen Cambone, member of the Center
for Strategic and Intemational Studies, when he
addressed the Political Committee on
8th March 1995. He sffessed that both NATO and
the European Union are at the moment in turmoil
caused by domestic difficulties and procedural
problems. Both organisations were also under
extemal pressure. Since NATO and the European
Union were different and not complementary, the
notion of " pillars o'was not appropriate any more.
Both sides had to start again in order to define
where their common interests lay. Otherwise it
would not be possible to allocate the different
tasks between NAIO and WEU. If the intergo-
vernmental conference on the revision of the
Maastricht Treaty did not lead to success the Uni-
ted States could lose hope in a United Europe.
Account of the fact should also be taken that sub-
stantial economic and trade problems between the
United States and Europe had to be settled. Euro-
pe should develop a clear and open concept from
which the United States should not be excluded.
The United States should be regarded as a Euro-
pean power. NATO should continue to play the
main r6le in defence whereas WEU's r6le should
be more political, focusing on creating a system of
collective security. On this basis one might begin
talking about expansion.
44. Finally, a repofi by the Transatlantic Policy
Network, a group of political leaders and multina-
tional companies, recommends three steps to
strengthen links between the United States and
Europee:
- 
The transformation of the present Trans-
atlantic Declaration into an economic and
political treaty between the European
Union and the United States aimed at
creating a 'North Atlantic free trade area'
which would cover regulatory co-opera-
tion, mutual recognition of product
approvals, standardisation and certifica-
tion, and Eeatment of foreign investment.
- 
Reforming NATO around a partnership
between the United States and a Euro-
pean defence pillar. Though the authors
8. Intemational Politik, January 1995, No. 1.
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suggest further integrating defence and
military procurement in Europe, they
found ono firm foundation' for a coherent
European approach on securiry matters.
- 
A new process for transatlantic summits
which would bring together the annual
NATO summit and the biennial United
States-European Union meetings. The
aim is to exploit the Clinton administra-
tion's shift toward strengthening the
European defence pillar within NATO
and its support for greater European poli
tical integration built around the Union.
With one eye on the 1996 intergovernmental
conference to review the Maastricht Treaty, the
report says there is a 'window of opportunify' for
real power-sharing between the United States and
European Union. The onus is on member states,
including Britain, to take further steps to integrate
political, economic and security policies within
the European Union in 1996.
45. [t is obvious that any thoughts in this direc-
tion, which has substantial support in several
European countries, have reached only a prelimi-
nary stage. It will not only be interesting to know
how the United States envisages transforming
Atlantic relations into a community of real equal
partners, but also Canada's position in this context.
The Canadians have stressed that they still consi-
der NATO the bedrock of joint uansatlantic secur-
ity in which they are prepared to participate even
though their practical contribution has diminished.
However, unofficially, fears were expressed that
Canada risked being totally marginalised if the
United States and a United Europe developed into
a community of truly equal partners.
IV. LessonsforWEU
46. It was perhaps typical that one of the last
questions put by Mr. Gilman, Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives during the meeting with the Political
Committee in March 1995 should have been the
following: why do we need WEU? This shows that
notwithstanding the decision reached at the NAIO
summit meeting in January 1994 when the United
States recognised Westem European Union as the
nucleus of the emerging European defence ident-
ity, the r6le and function of WEU remain largely
unknown even among American politicians.
47. It is therefore necessary to repeat again that
WEU must do far more to explain its functions to
relevant American authorities and also the press.
The r6le of WEU in the framework of the future
shaping of transatlantic relations should be one of
the main items on the agenda of the WEU Coun-
cil. It is therefore regrettable that, whereas the
Noordwijk declaration includes a declaration of
intention on this problem, the second part of the
fortieth annual report says nothing about future
Euro-American relations.
48. The Council has various means for streng-
thening its relationship with the American autho-
rities in Brussels in the framework of its co-opera-
tion with NATO and by establishing direct
contacts with representatives of the United States.
49. Furthermore, the preparation of a white
paper on European security should be taken as an
opportunity to include an important chapter on
future transatlantic relations and the r6le of WEU
in this context. Finally, the new working group on
Transatlantic Publicity Activities should be stron-
gly activated and transformed into a high-level
political forum to allow an enhanced dialogue
with North American politicians in Canada, the
United States and in Europe.
V Conclusions
50. Considering that the United States is the
only remaining global power, that its borders and
security are protected by two oceans and that it is
no longer directly threatened by any other oppo-
sing superpower, it is difficult to foresee which
direction its foreign policy will take. The United
States can afford to follow apolicy which it consi-
ders to be in its interest and consequently also to
change its policy in specific matters without
taking too much account of other countries, or
even its allies. American policy regarding the
conflict in former Yugoslavia has for instance
changed radically since 1992.
51. Perhaps one of the committee members
was right, when he stated during the talks at the
Heritage Foundation in Washington, that the Uni-
ted States was the only country still able to follow
a " Realpolitik " which would never be totally
coherent. But regardless of whether the American
presidency is weak or strong, one can count on
one peilnanent and constant factor: the will for
leadership is in no way lessened even if it appears
in somewhat different forms.
52. As to Europe, it is essential that European
preoccupations, and the reasons why a stronger
European political and security identity is also in the
American interest, become better known. On the
other hand, the more the United States is tempted to
follow is political interests in dealing directly wittt
leading powers in various regions of the world and
especially Russi4 without paying much attention to
consultations with its European allies, the more it is
necessary for Europe to pursue its efforts to shape a
true security and defence identrry, the status and atti-
tude of which cannot be neglected.
IMPRIMERIE O ALENQONNAISE 
- 
Rue Edouard-Belin, 2'trimestre 1995 
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